Tag Archives: New Jersey

November 12, 1881: Paterson, NJ Water Supply; 1732: Pitot Tube Invention

Great Falls at Paterson, New Jersey

November 12, 1881: Article in Engineering News—The History and Statistics of American Water-Works. “Paterson, New Jersey, is on the Passaic River, about 16 miles NW of New York City, at the point where the river breaks through the great trap-dyke called the Watchung or Orange Mountain, and falls 80 ft. The water power afforded by this fall with a water-shed of 855 square miles above it, was purchased in 1791 ‘by the Society for the Encouragement of Useful Manufactures,’ and is still controlled by them. A dam across the river a short distance above the falls diverts the water into a canal, from which it is drawn to furnish power to 13 manufacturing establishments.

Water-works were built in 1856 by a private company, taking the supply from the river at the edge of the falls and below the Society’s dam. The surplus flow of the river passing over the dam was used for power and for supply. A turbine wheel was placed in a rift in the face of the falls, which, being erected over the masonry made a tail race. The wheel drove a piston pump which forced the water into a small reservoir on an eminence in the city. As the consumption increased, the amount of water in the river which was not used for mill purposes was insufficient for motive power and supply, notwithstanding the erection by the company of a small stone dam along the face of the falls, making a little pool for storage below the Society’s dam. In 1878, a Worthington high-pressure engine and pump of 8,000,000 gallons’ capacity were erected. The original pumps driven by water force have been replaced by others. There are now two horizontal pumps with a combined capacity of 14,000,000 gallons per day, and one with 2,000,000 capacity. There are three reservoirs, built in excavation and embankment, supplying different levels of the city. Their capacities are, respectively, 8, 8, and 2,000,000 gallons.”

Reference: Croes, J. James. “The History and Statistics of American Water-Works.” Engineering News. 8 (November 12, 1881): 459.

CommentaryThe water supply for Paterson figures prominently in my book, The Chlorine Revolution, which was published in April 2013. Dr. John L. Leal was the Public Health Officer for Paterson from 1890 to 1899 and he was responsible for the safety of this water supply. In 1899 because of increasing contamination of the Passaic River, the water supply withdrawal point was moved 5 miles upstream to Little Falls.

Different Early Versions of the Pitot Tube

November 12, 1732Today in Science History. “In 1732, Henri Pitot read a paper to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris about an instrument he had invented to measure the flow velocity at different depths of water in the River Seine. It had a scale and two open vertical glass tubes on a wood frame. The lower end of one pointed down, the other bent at 90º facing the flow. The belief of the time was that flow velocity at a given depth was proportional to the mass above it, meaning increasing velocity at greater depth. Recording the difference in liquid levels in the two tubes, he showed the opposite was true. Henri Darcy improved the design, with the support of Henri Bazin.”

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October 22, 1914: Trenton Water Treatment Plant

October 22, 1914: Municipal Journal feature article–Water Purification at Trenton. “For fifteen years the improvement of the public water supply at Trenton, N.J., which was drawn from the Delaware River without treatment, has been a question that has received much consideration. Johnson and Fuller, consulting engineers, of New York City, who were retained to design a plant, in 1912 presented plans for rapid sand filters with a capacity of 30,000,000 gallons per day. This plant is now practically completed….For several years past, the typhoid death rate in Trenton has shown the need of a modern filtration plant. The average death rate from that cause for the ten years ending 1900 was 28 [per 100,000 people], while for the years 1908, 1909 and 1910 it was 54, 36 and 53, respectively. In 1911 the use of hypochlorite was adopted and was effective in reducing the typhoid death rate, but the unfiltered water is very unsatisfactory, especially in appearance. The plant, which is located at the foot of Calhoun street, just above the present pumping works, consists of covered sedimentation basins, sixteen filters, a clear water basin, a low-lift pumping plant, a head house, conduits and complete filter equipment.”

Reference: “Water Purification at Trenton.” Municipal Journal. 37:17 (October 22, 1914): 589-91.

Commentary:  There were people in Trenton who opposed any move to treat the disease-laden water from the Delaware River. It is incomprehensible that they resisted all attempts. Below is an excerpt from my book The Chlorine Revolution:  Water Disinfection and the Fight To Save Lives.

“Trenton, the capital of New Jersey, was home to about 97,000 citizens in 1911. The city’s water source was the Delaware River, which had been grossly contaminated with sewage for decades. Typhoid fever was ever-present in the city, and occasionally epidemics broke out, causing much higher death rates. The typhoid fever death rate during 1902–1911 ranged from 26.2 to 84.3 per 100,000 people, with an average of 49.7 per 100,000.

Despite the water supply’s wholesale killing of Trenton’s citizens, there was tremendous opposition to installing filtration or any other kind of effective treatment. Outstanding treatment experts such as Allen Hazen and George Warren Fuller prepared two separate designs for filtration plants, both of which languished without being implemented. Finally, the New Jersey Board of Health had had enough. In early 1910, the board issued a “compulsory order” for Trenton to treat its water supply and made the order effective shortly thereafter, on June 15. The Trenton Water Board began to install a chloride of lime feed system, but, incredibly, the local health board vetoed the plan. Wasting no time, the New Jersey Board of Health filed a lawsuit shortly after the June 15 deadline to compel the city to move forward with its plans.”

Even after all of this, it would still take a long time to get filtration and disinfection into place.

October 16, 1988: Asbury Park Beach Pollution

October 16, 1988New York Times headline–Asbury Park Fined for Beach Pollution. “The state of New Jersey has fined Asbury Park more than $1 million for causing the ocean pollution that closed a popular stretch of Monmouth County beaches for 19 days this summer.

Mistakes by the city in cleaning out its sewage lines were responsible for the high ocean bacteria levels that closed the beaches, a report that accompanied the announcement of the fine said.

The fine is the largest ever levied against a municipality by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

In its 19-page report, released Tuesday, the department said that Asbury Park had failed to adequately maintain sewer lines for two years and that, in June and July, when it tried to clean out lines coagulated with greasy sewage, it flushed them to an old primary treatment plant incapable of handling all the waste. Large clumps of grease containing high levels of fecal bacteria eventually got into the ocean and broke up in the surf, forcing officials to close beaches in Asbury Park, Ocean Grove, Bradley Beach, Avon, Spring Lake, Belmar and Allenhurst in July.”

September 29, 1908: First Day of Second Jersey City Trial; 1987 W.R. Grace Indicted

Trial transcripts for the Second Jersey City trial, 3000 pages

September 29, 1908: In 1899, Jersey City, New Jersey contracted for the construction of a new water supply on the Rockaway River, which was 23 miles west of the City. The water supply included a dam, reservoir and pipeline and was completed on May 23, 1904. As was common during this time period, no treatment (except for detention and sedimentation fostered by Boonton Reservoir) was provided to the water supply. City officials were not pleased with the project as delivered by the private water company and filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court of New Jersey. Among the many complaints by Jersey City officials was the contention that the water served to the City was not “pure and wholesome” as required by the contract.

At the conclusion of the first trial, Vice Chancellor Frederic W. Stevens found that two or three times per year, the water did not meet the standard of “pure and wholesome” as required by the contract. He ordered that sewers be installed in the watershed or that “other plans or devices” that were equivalent to sewering the towns in the watershed could be installed. A second trial was scheduled to test whether the “other plans or devices” met the requirements of the judgment.

The second Jersey City trial started on September 29, 1908. The first order of business on the first day was a request by the defendants to postpone everything. William H. Corbin made a long statement in which he, once again, summarized the opinion and decree by Vice Chancellor Stevens. He also described in general terms the “alternate plans and devices” that the company was installing at the Boonton Reservoir site as, “…an experimental plant for the introducing of oxygen into the flow of water as it comes from the dam.”

Corbin stated that the experimental plant was put into use “last Saturday” which would have been September 26, 1908. He noted that Vice Chancellor Stevens desired daily bacteriological analyses during the first trial but the company had not gathered the data with that frequency. Corbin said that the company had been taking daily bacteriological samples over the summer and wanted to continue the sampling through the next few months to catch rainfall and significant runoff events. He also wanted more time to operate the “works” to demonstrate conclusively that the water that would be delivered to Jersey City from the plant would be “pure and wholesome.” He requested a three-month adjournment in the trial.

James B. Vredenburgh, attorney for the plaintiffs, acknowledged that a delay was needed, but he stated that two months would be sufficient. His position was that if the water was of doubtful quality, the risk to the population of Jersey City for contracting waterborne diseases was too high and no delay in finding a solution should be allowed. He was particularly concerned that a typhoid fever carrier could potentially contaminate the water above Boonton Reservoir. He also mentioned concerns with high death rates from childhood diarrhea which he said was related to the quality of the drinking water.

He also complained that Jersey City was paying the company for water delivered from Boonton Reservoir and that it would be significantly cheaper for the City to purchase the dam, reservoir and “works” rather than to continue to pay the water delivery charge. There were other issues of riparian rights along the Passaic River that needed to be settled which were agreed to by both sides.

Vredenburgh stated that it was his understanding that the treatment that would be applied to the water consisted of passing electricity through air and producing “ozone,” which would then be introduced into the water. There is no mention in the trial transcripts, exhibits, or reports of the company testing ozone or proposing its use. The company’s insistence that they would be adding oxygen to the water to sterilize it may have given Vredenburgh and the City the impression that ozone was the treatment method selected.

Based on his questions and comments, the Special Master for the second trial, William J. Magie, clearly understood the arguments for adjournment by both counsels. Even though he was not up to speed on all aspects of the case, he could rely on Vice Chancellor’s opinion that required him to carefully examine the “alternate plans and devices.” He agreed to a three-month adjournment and scheduled the second day of trial for January 5, 1909.

Reference: McGuire, Michael J. 2013. The Chlorine Revolution: Water Disinfection and the Fight to Save Lives. Denver, CO:American Water Works Association.

W.R. Grace and Contaminated Wells

September 29, 1987New York Times headline–W.R. Grace is Charged with Lying About Waste. A Federal grand jury today indicted W. R. Grace & Company on charges that it lied to the United States Environmental Protection Agency about the use of chemicals and waste disposal techniques at its industrial plant in Woburn, Mass.

Officials at Grace, a diversified company with headquarters in New York, denied issuing any false statements and termed the grand jury’s charges ”unjust and without merit.”

The indictment today follows a lawsuit last summer in which eight families from Woburn asserted that toxic discharges from the Grace plant had contaminated their water wells, causing six deaths from leukemia and numerous illnesses in the families. In July, a jury found that Grace had contaminated the water with two solvents but was unable to determine the date at which the chemicals began to pollute the wells. $8 Million Settlement Reported The case was settled out of court in September. The amount of the settlement was not disclosed, but Grace is reported to have paid the families $8 million, although it denied that its chemicals had caused the diseases.”

September 26, 1994: Tucson Shuts off CAP Supply; 1908: First Chlorine Use in US; 1855: Handle Put Back on Broad Street Pump

September 26, 1994: Tucson Shuts off Direct Delivery of Central Arizona Project Water Supply. Corrosive water destroying pipes in a major American city preceded the events in Flint, Michigan by over two decades. On November 4, 1992, the water department for Tucson, Arizona, (Tucson Water or TW) began delivery of a new water supply: treated surface water from the Central Arizona Project (CAP)—primarily Colorado River water. Putting treated CAP water into the TW distribution system caused a corrosion problem that resulted in colored water (e.g., rusty, red, orange, yellow and brown) flowing from customer taps. Tucson’s introduction of CAP water is a story of mistakes committed at all levels of the utility and by the Tucson City Council.

Technical mistakes included not preparing the distribution system to receive a more complex surface water supply. TW was a groundwater utility that relied on about 200 wells distributed throughout the system. Recognizing their lack of experience with treating surface water, they hired treatment plant operators from other utilities to run the new $80 million leading-edge-technology treatment plant. Unfortunately, the same level of focus and preparation was not applied to the aging distribution system, which received, literally overnight, a chloraminated supply to half its customers from a single point of entry.

One of the biggest mistakes was not testing the impact of treated CAP water on corroded galvanized steel pipes. There were about 200 miles of this 2-inch substandard pipe in the system. When treated CAP water hit these pipes, the iron corrosion deposits inside the pipes were stripped away causing colored water, taste and odor problems, and damage to home plumbing, appliances and property due to flooding.

There was a rush to deliver CAP water and to hold down costs to the detriment of needed studies, which would have shown that raising the treated water pH for corrosion control was the proper approach.

Also high on the list of pre-delivery problems was a lack of political will to replace the substandard galvanized and cast iron street mains. The presence of these substandard pipes made the TW distribution system ripe for a catastrophic corrosion problem due to unsound corrosion control practices.

Delivery of CAP water was terminated on September 26, 1994, because of the inability of TW to control the colored water problem and the resulting political uproar. The $80 million treatment plant was shut down and has not been used since.

After a series of management resignations and firings over several years, Tucson hired David Modeer as the Director of TW. Modeer and his management team put the utility on the road to recovery. Along with a carefully planned technical program to select the correct corrosion treatment and deal with the taste and odor problems, an innovative public information campaign that also included a public apology for the CAP debacle, began to restore the credibility of TW. Customers were invited to actively participate in determining the future use, treatment and quality of CAP water via such methods as consumer preference research and participation in an extensive bottled water program.

Dedication of CAVSARP/Clearwater Project, 5/3/01

After the voters defeated a proposition in 1999 that would have severely limited the ability to use CAP water in the future, TW completed an aquifer storage and recovery project in the nearby Avra Valley. The Central Avra Valley Storage and Recovery Project (CAVSARP) allowed the utility to fully use its CAP allotment and serve a recovered groundwater/recharged CAP water mix that was accepted by TW customers. Tucson Water turned around a disaster into a singular success. Because of its ability to conjunctively use CAP water and groundwater, Tucson is now one of the more drought-resistant communities in the Southwest.

Commentary: Marie Pearthree and I are writing a book about what happened in Tucson before, during and after the corrosion problem doomed their new water supply. A wealth of material has revealed previously unknown information related to TW’s problems. The results of these efforts are much-needed lessons for water utilities on how to avoid TW’s mistakes and how to successfully introduce a new water supply. As of this date in 2017, we are finishing up the research and beginning to write some of the chapters. It is hard to predict when we will complete the book, but we will be giving papers on what we have found during our research at several venues in 2018. Watch this space for presentation times, dates and locations.

Building on the right housed the chloride of lime feed facility at Boonton Reservoir

September 26, 1908:  106th anniversary of the first day of operation of the chlorination facility at Boonton Reservoir for Jersey City, NJ.  This was the first continuous use of chlorine in the U.S. for drinking water disinfection.

In the field of water supply, there were big moves afoot in the state of New Jersey at the turn of the 20th century. Jersey City had suffered with a contaminated water supply for decades causing tens of thousands of deaths from typhoid fever and diarrheal diseases. In 1899, the City contracted with the Jersey City Water Supply Company to build a dam on the Rockaway River and provide a new water supply. The dam created Boonton Reservoir, which had a storage capacity of over seven billion gallons. One of the company’s employees, Dr. John L. Leal, would have an enormous impact on this water supply and the history of water treatment. Leal was a physician, public health professional and water quality expert. Leal’s job with the company was to remove sources of contamination in the Rockaway River watershed above the reservoir. Water from the project was served to the City beginning on May 23, 1904.

When it came time for Jersey City to pay the company for the new water supply, they balked. The price tag was steep—over $175 million in current dollars. Using newly developed bacteriological methods, consultants for the City claimed that the water was not “pure and wholesome,” and they filed suit against the company to get a reduced purchase price. The trial that resulted pitted the water quality experts of the day against one another in a battle of expert witnesses.

The opinion of the judge was published on May 1, 1909. In that opinion, Vice Chancellor Frederic W. Stevens said that Boonton Reservoir did a good job on average of reducing the bacteria concentrations in the water provided. However, he noted that two to three times per year, especially after intense rainstorms, the reservoir short-circuited and relatively high bacteria levels resulted.

Rather than build expensive sewers that would deal with only part of the bacteria contamination problem (an early recognition of non-point source pollution) Leal and the company attorney argued to install “other plans or devices” that would do a better job. The judge agreed and gave them a little over three months to prove their idea. Leal had decided in May 1908 that it was time to add a chemical disinfectant to drinking water. He was all too familiar with the suffering and death caused by typhoid fever and diarrheal diseases. He knew of some successful instances of using forms of chlorine in Europe, but nothing had been attempted in the U.S. on such a large-scale basis.

Leal was convinced that adding a disinfectant to the Jersey City water supply was the best course. He had done laboratory studies that convinced him that a fraction of a ppm of chlorine would kill disease-causing bacteria. In the face of the certain disapproval of his peers and possible condemnation by the public, he moved forward.

However, no chlorine feed system treating 40 million gallons per day had ever been designed or built and if the feed system failed to operate reliably, all of the courage of his convictions would not have amounted to much. He needed the best engineer in the country to do the work. He needed George Warren Fuller. In 1908, Fuller was famous for his work in filtration. He had designed an aluminum sulfate feed system treating 30 million gallons per day for the Little Falls treatment plant. On July 19, 1908, Leal left his attorney’s office in Jersey City and took the ferry to Manhattan. In Fuller’s office at 170 Broadway, he hired the famous engineer (undoubtedly on the basis of a handshake) and told him that the bad news was that he needed the work done in a little over three months.

Ninety-nine days later, the chlorine feed system was built and operational. Calcium hypochlorite (known then as chloride of lime or bleaching powder) was made into a concentrated solution, diluted with water and fed through a calibrated orifice to the water before it traveled by gravity to Jersey City. The feed system worked flawlessly from day one and continued to operate successfully for all of the following days. Liquid chlorine eventually replaced chloride of lime, but September 26, 2013, marks the 105th anniversary of the first continuous use of chlorine on a water supply—the longest period of water disinfection anywhere in the world.

Reference: McGuire, Michael J. 2013. The Chlorine Revolution: Water Disinfection and the Fight to Save Lives. Denver, CO:American Water Works Association.

Broadwick [formerly, Broad] Street showing the John Snow memorial and public house.

September 26, 1855:  The St. James Board of Commissioners of Paving voted 10 to 2 to reopen the Broad Street pump at the urging of local residents.  Dr. John Snow had prevailed upon them a year earlier to remove the pump handle after he presented his evidence that cholera deaths were geographically clustered around the well site.

Reference: Vinten-Johansen, Peter, Howard Brody, Nigel Paneth, Stephen Rachman and Michael Rip. Cholera, Chloroform, and the Science of Medicine. New York:Oxford University, 2003, 310.

September 22, 1990: Main Break in Jersey City

September 22, 1990New York Times headline–300,000 Lose Water Supply In New Jersey. “About 300,000 people in Jersey City, Hoboken, and Lyndhurst were left without water for three and a half hours yesterday when an aqueduct ruptured.

Though the break was isolated and bypassed by 8:30 A.M. and full pressure was restored by noon, water ran brown with sediment throughout the day. Schools in Hoboken were ordered shut, factories were disrupted and thousands of households, after awakening to no water, endured the day with a mix of inconvenience, exasperation and kindness. Josephine Kardell, who lives near the valve station at Summit and St. Paul’s Avenues, said her tap water was still brown late yesterday afternoon. ”It’s too dirty,” she said. ”You can’t fill your tub with it. It’ll be black. I’ll have to wait until it’s clear.”

The broken aqueduct is a 6-foot-wide, 95-year-old main that links Jersey City with its main supply source, the Boonton Reservoir in Morris County. The break occurred about 5 A.M. in marshland on the west bank of the Hackensack River in Lyndhurst about 1.5 miles south of Giants Stadium.”

Commentary: This is the aqueduct built by the Jersey City Water Supply Company that started operating the water supply in 1904. The history of the Boonton water supply and the first use of chlorine on the supply in 1908 are detailed in my book, The Chlorine Revolution: Water Disinfection and the Fight to Save Lives.

September 21, 1995: New Jersey Drought Hotline

September 21, 1995New York Times headline–May Birdbath Be Filled? “Water Curbs Raise Queries. Can a birdbath be refilled from a bucket of water? Can dusty high school football and soccer fields be sprayed from private wells? Can a car be washed during a rainstorm? The answers given callers to New Jersey’s new drought-emergency telephone line: yes, no and yes, but only with the rainwater.

So goes life — and the dos and don’ts of outdoor water use — after government intervenes in a prolonged dry spell and orders people to start conserving. For now, the mandatory water restrictions imposed Sept. 13 apply to about three million people in 119 communities in northeastern New Jersey.

But, officials warn, millions more in New York City and much of the rest of New Jersey will face mandatory rules — and questions — unless far heavier rains than last Sunday morning’s arrive to revive the region’s reservoirs. Yesterday, Gov. Tom Ridge decreed similar mandatory restrictions over much of Pennsylvania, in an area affecting about 6.5 million people.”